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The pathologist is not the ideal person to make an appraisal of safety equipment. At best, he must be hazarding a guess as to what might have altered the outcome, either in the particular case under investigation or in the future. Nevertheless, aviation pathology has always been regarded as a part of preventive medicine. We work to prevent accidents and, if this fails, to prevent fatal accidentsand it is worth reiterating that the two objectives are not identical. The prevention of fatal accidents is a matter of correlating pathological findings with the findings in the safety equipment in use. The pathologist's approach must depend on whether or not the necessary equipment was provided.
In the examination of fatal accidents in which apparently adequate equipment was provided the following questions should be considered.
Was it Properly Used?
Certain items tend to be maltreated; these often lie in something of a limbo between two distinct sets of equipment. The life-saving jacket connecting the flying clothing to the survival equipment is a case in point. A particularly dangerous position is at the bottom of the jacket where an attachment must be made to the personal survival pack, this being essentially a part of the parachute assembly.
We have recently had a spate of drownings following ejection in which there has been a recurring theme of anomalies in this connexion (Table 1) . A very old case, in which a man was not equipped with a life-saving jacket and was therefore forced to enter the water with his parachute deployed in a moderately strong wind, was attributed to drowning following dragging on the finding of an ante-mortem fracture of the humerus. Subsequently, two almost identical cases have presented in which the fault lay in The situation envisaged here is akin to that in which a diagonal shoulder harness in a car might possibly contribute to a road accident death from a broken neck. Such situations must be very rare in military aviation as the design and provision of equipment is centrally directed on the basis of intensive research. Cases do, however, occasionally occur. In this context, it cannot be overstressed that all safety equipment is, to some extent, a matter of compromise; what may be life-saving in one configuration may have an adverse effect in another. Two examples may be cited.
In spite of the remarkable ability of the Mk lI protective helmet to prevent skull fracture, there has been at least one example of death due to fracture of the cervical spine during ejection which was attributed to contact with the cockpit canopy following withdrawal of the head firingblind over the shoulder. It may well be that, with certain body builds, the sheer bulk of the new helmet makes it difficult to pull the blind over the head.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the need for compromise arose in the obsolescent problem of unassisted escape from jet fighter aircraft, notably the Vampire (Mason 1962) . A steady series of fatal cases indicated that the difficulty of egress from the cockpit was exaggerated by the carrying of dinghies; orders were therefore given that these were no longer to be worn. Almost Attention can now be given to circumstances in which equipment is either not provided or not accepted.
Did Failure to Provide Equipment Contribute to the Death ? Generally speaking, this is a problem which exists only in private aviation. A most depressing spectrum of fatal light aircraft accidents has evolved: the deceleration forces are commonly survivable and there is no fire; the pilot often dies from a single fatal lesion centred upon either the head or the cardiovascular system; and there is almost universal failure to provide a protective helmet, combined with very frequent lack of shoulder harness restraint. These two items of equipment deserve consideration in some detail.
Protective helmets: There are certain circumstances in which protective helmets must be provided. In military aviation they must be worn as protection against buffeting and they must be provided when escape from high-speed aircraft is by conventional methods only. They are essential in all types of aircraft as a protection in the event of being thrown clear following a crash of impact type. In crashes or severe ditchings in the sea, the protective helmet may be an essential safeguard against unconsciousness leading to death from drowning.
These reasons are sufficient to sustain the contention that protective helmets should be worn as routine in light aircraft aviation. But, surprisingly, direct protection of the skull likely to be provided by a helmet in uncomplicated crashes involving such aircraft is not easy to prove from the material in our department.
The departmental records of fatalities in light aviation have recently been reviewed. The craniofacial injuries listed in Table 2 are derived only from cases within the personal knowledge of the author. In these, damage to the skull in the area amenable to protection by a helmet is comparatively rare. The number of middle-third fractures is remarkable (52 % of all cases, 70 % of survivable accident cases) and they may be extremely localized. In addition, there are a number of cases of fatal damage to the base of the skull transmitted through the temporomandibular joints.
Shoulder harness restraint: Such injuries, although beyond the protection of a helmet, should theoretically be prevented by the use of shoulder harness restraint. The subjective impression is that this is the truly reprehensible omission in light aircraft. Time and again the pathologist is confronted with the results of an essentially survivable accident. At autopsy he may find very severe facial injuries or bizarre causes of death such as single penetrating wounds or inhalation of blood from localized facial fractures. Alternatively, death may be due to fracture of the base resulting from a blow to the chin. Moreover, many of these pilots actually die from an associated rupture of the heart or aorta. None the less, although it appears subjectively obvious, it is not easy from purely post-mortem material to show statistically the superiority as a life-saving measure of shoulder harness over the commonly used lap belt.
The present study has been confined to fatalities occurring in the pilot/co-pilot position. Thus limited, the results come out rather differently from those previously published (Stevens 1968 ). The almost identical distribution of shoulder harness and lap belts in survivable and nonsurvivable accidents shown in Table 3 is to be expectedthe harness in use can have no effect on the way in which the aircraft crashes. What is surprising is the very similar distribution of the total number of fatalities irrespective of the type of harness in use. This may well result from the definition of 'survivable accidents' -a most subjective assessmentand it was felt necessary to turn to those accidents in which there was actually a survivor (Table 4) : despite the inevitably small number of cases involved, the difference becomes marked and is statistically linked to the type of harness in use (P< 0.05). Even so, the question why we have so many dead persons equipped with a shoulder harness in apparently survivable accidents is unanswered. The answer seems to lie not so much in a false concept of the function of shoulder harness as in the faulty execution of that concept. Analysis of the individual accidents (Table 5) shows that the shoulder harness principle can be exonerated from the fatal outcome in at least three-quarters of all the cases. This being so, the overall results would be unlikely to show any dramatic reduction or differing pattern of injuries resulting from the use of shoulder harness and, generally, this negative expectation is realized (Table 6 ). None the less, the results of using a shoulder harness tend to show a decrease in the cases of facial injury associated with radiating fractures in the base (including both maxillary and mandibular impact). Shoulder harness also very probably provides the essential protection against cardiovascular rupture. The very comparable series reported by Reals et al. (1964) and Stevens (1968) do not differentiate as to the type of harness in use; the effect of selection in the present study cannot, therefore, bejudged.
Conclusion
Fatal aircraft accidents are so rare that the collection of statistically valid figures by one pathological department is extremely difficult; the case for international studies based on comparable investigative techniques is therefore strong. Even so, the study of the individual cases can often yield useful, and sometimes spectacular, results. The investigation of small groups of strictly comparable fatal incidents greatly amplifies the resultant value and this type of comparative study is only possible in a centralized unit (Mason 1970) . It is in this way that the RAF Department of Aviation Pathology makes its main contribution to the safety of its flying colleagues.
